I am an economist, but not a lawyer. Here's my take. Sorry if this causes any nightmarish dejavou to econ 110, but I thought some might be interested.

From an economic argument, in order for the BCS to warrant some type of government intervention (in my view) it needs to be clear that the BCS system is creating a market imperfection (or distortion). (The legalites would probably like to take this further and examine if it's creating a market imperfection larger than what it's trying to solve).

But what's the market here? That depends on how we define the product. What are people really spending their money on? College football game entertainment, broadly. This has at least two salient parts--the value of the quality of the game itself and the value of the utility of discovering which are the best teams in an ordinal bivariate ranking (meaning we only get to see who's better than who) and resulting weak inference on the ordinal ranking of the teams in a particular game to teams outside that game for final rankings/national champion.

The most obvious potential market imperfection here is a barrier to entry.
Does the BCS system constitute a barrier to entry into this market? Plausibly yes if it can be shown that another firm can't come into the market because of non-pecuniary obstacles caused by the BCS. (That is, another firm selling a related product--say a playoff system involving all of the schools--can't cry foul if fans simply don't want to pay for their product.) But if the schools are contractually engaged to the BCS such that they could not play in a different system if they wanted to, then the BCS could potentially be charged with creating a barrier to entry. They'd presumably be doing this as either a monopolist, a monopsonist, or both.

Roughly, If fans can only buy the product from one place, the firm is a monopolist. Again, I'm not a lawyer, so I have no idea about schools' contractual obligations with the BCS.

But we could also argue, perhaps, that a market for the entertainment of determining a CFB champion constitutes a 'natural monopoly.' That is, because of huge fixed costs, the market can only support one firm. Maybe, if we think that having two parallel systems would undermine the quality of the product of each one. This would only really hold if the same college team could not play in two systems because of the rules the BCS put in place. (The NCAA prohibiting them from doing that is another matter. Presumably the market would pay to see Georgia play twice in December.) A monopoly of any kind--natural or otherwise--is economic grounds for considering intervention.

Alternately, we could look at this from the football programs' perspective. In which case our best bet is to try to argue that the BCS is a monopsonist--that they're the sole buyer of a team's product. If they were, monopsonies are often rightly subject to public intervention (now the government's 'cure' might be worse than the disease, but there is at least room for intervention from the perspective of economics). But as we know, conferences, acting as proxies for teams with something like 'power of attorney', shop their product (teams) around to multiple different buyers like the Las Vegas Bowl, the New Mexico Bowl, etc. So the monopsony argument doesn't seem to hold too well. Maybe it does for the 'top' 10 programs; I'm not sure, but I think Georgia could have offered to play in the LV Bowl without any legal ramifications. Not sure.

Perhaps instead this is simply a market imperfection known as a 'coordination failure'. (Think of two railroads with different gauges of track). If schools cannot play in two systems (because of NCAA regs or fed/state law) and they have to pick a system, then it's going to be tough to compare schools in system A with those in system B, so the market for entertainment in knowing a 'champion' is at least partially derailed.

So to sum up: I think the monopoly or monopsony allegations against the BCS are weak but could stick. I think the potential characterization of the market as a coordination failure or natural monopoly is also a bit weak. Overall I think the BCS creates less inefficiency (monopoly/monopsony) than it 'solves' (natural monopoly/coordination failure). A lawyer might respond, "Yes, but could the existing market inefficiencies (naturally occurring or caused by the NCAA/law) be solved in a more efficient way than the BCS?" My answer is yes.